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 GENERALIZED SYMMETRY CONDITIONS
 AT A CORE POINT1
 BY RICHARD D. MCKELVEY AND NORMAN SCHOFIELD
 Previous analyses have shown that if a point is to be a core of a majority rule voting
 game in Euclidean space, when preferences are smooth, then the utility gradients at the
 point must satisfy certain restrictive symmetry conditions. In this paper, these results are
 generalized to the case of an arbitrary voting rule, and necessary and sufficient conditions,
 expressed in terms of the utility gradients of "pivotal" coalitions, are obtained.
 1. INTRODUCTION
 IT IS NOW WELL KNOWN that if the set of alternatives can be represented as a
 subset of Euclidean space, and individual preferences are smooth, then the
 individual utility gradients at a point in the majority core must satisfy strong
 symmetry conditions (Plott (1967)). The necessity that these symmetry conditions
 be satisfied can be used to prove the generic nonexistence of core points in certain
 situations (McKelvey and Schofield (1986)). The same symmetry conditions can
 be used to show that if the majority rule core is empty, then it will generally be
 the case that voting trajectories can be constructed throughout the space.
 This paper generalizes the Plott symmetry conditions to deal with arbitrary
 voting rules, obtaining restrictions on the gradients at a point which are necessary
 and sufficient for that point to be in the core. The generalized gradient restrictions
 that we identify show the central role of what we term the "pivotal" coalitions
 in determining when core points exist. Specifically, we define a coalition, M, to
 be pivotal in a subset L of the voters, if it is the case that whenever we partition
 L - M into two subsets, at least one of these subsets, together with the members
 of M, constitutes a decisive coalition. Our symmetry conditions specify that for
 x to be a core point, the utility gradients of the members of any subset, L, of
 voters must satisfy the following condition: For every pivotal coalition M in L,
 the set of utility gradients which lie in the subspace spanned by those in M, must
 positively span 0 (the zero vector). Taking L to be the set of nonsatiated voters,
 it is easily shown that the Plott symmetry conditions for the existence of a majority
 core point are implied by this condition. The pivotal gradient condition can also
 be applied to get necessary conditions for a point to be in the constrained core,
 and hence for a point to be outside the cycle set of an arbitrary voting rule.
 l An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Weingart Conference on Formal Models
 of Voting, March 22-23, 1985, California Institute of Technology. The contribution of the first author
 is supported, in part, by NSF Grant SES-84-09654 to the California Institute of Technology, and
 that of the second author is based on work supported by NSF Grant SES-84-18295 to the School of
 Social Sciences, University of California at Irvine. We are grateful to David Austen-Smith, Charles
 Plott, and Jeff Strand for a number of helpful observations.
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 2. DEFINITION AND NOTATION
 We let Wc Rw represent the set of alternatives. Let N = {1, 2,..., n} be a finite
 set indexing voters. Let U denote the set of smooth, real valued functions on W,
 and let u = (ul,..., un) U", with ui representing the utility function for voter i.
 Throughout this paper, we consider only a fixed u E Un, and call such a u E Un
 a smooth profile.
 For any binary relation Q c W x W, we use the standard notation xQy > (x, y) E
 Q. We write P, for the binary relation on W defined by xPcy ui(x) > ui(y), and
 for any Cc N, write Pc =niec P.
 We are given a set D of subsets C c N, called the set of decisive coalitions,
 which is assumed to satisfy: (a) C D and C c C'> C' D (D is monotonic);
 (b) C D=>N- C D (D is proper). We can then define the social order
 Pc WxW by
 xPy xPcy for some C E D.
 For any binary relation, Q c Wx W, and x E W, define Q(x) = {y X: yQx},
 and write Q'(x)= Q(x). For any integer j > 1, define Qj(x) = {y E W: yQz for
 some ze Q'-l(x)}. Then define Q*(x)=UJ.j Q'(x). Also, for any Vc W, and
 Q c W x W, define Q v = Q n (V x V) to be the binary relation Q, restricted to
 V We can then define the core, or global optima set to be the set of socially
 unbeaten alternatives in V:
 GO(V, D)={x E V: (Plv)(x)= 0},
 and the local optima set on V by
 LO( V, D) = {x E V: x e GO( V', D) for some neighborhood
 V' of x in V}.
 We define the global cycle set to be the set of points which are elements of a
 cycle in V, under the social order:
 GC(V, D) = {x E V: x (PvI)*(x)},
 and the local cycle set by
 LC( V, D) = {x e V: x E GC( V', D) for all neighborhoods,
 V' of x in V}.
 When there is no fear of ambiguity we write GO(V), LO(V), etc. for these sets.
 We will also write GO = GO( W), LO = LO( W), etc. and call these the global
 or local optima sets with respect to D. Clearly,
 GO c LO and LC c GC.
 3. CONSTRAINTS ON GRADIENTS AT A CORE POINT
 In this section, we define the critical optimal set, IO( W, D), give its relation
 to the global and local optima sets, and characterize this set in terms of conditions
 on the utility gradients of members of decisive coalitions.
 924
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 For any x E W, and i E N, let pi(x) = Vui(x) E Rw represent voter i's utility
 gradient at the point x. For C c N, let
 pc(x)={yeRw: y= E aipi(x), aiOVie C and 3ie C s.t.ai O}0
 be the semi-positive cone generated by {pi(x): i C}, and let
 spc(x)={yERW: y= i ai,p(x) with aieR}
 iEC
 be the subspace spanned by {pi(x): i C}.2
 We use the notation Int W to refer to the interior of W in the standard topology
 on Rw, and write W= W\Int W for the boundary of W. We also make the
 assumption that Wc clos Int W where clos means the closure in the topology
 on Rw. This eliminates the possibility that W includes isolated points. Define the
 preference cone of coalition C c N at x by
 Hc(){x)=y W: p() (y-x) > 0Vi C}.
 Define the critical (or infinitesimal) optima set on Vc W with respect to D by
 IO(V,D)={xe V: VrnH+(x)= 0 VCD}.
 The critical optima set for D may be thought of as the analogue, for a social
 order, of the set of critical points of a smooth function. It is the set of points
 which, on the basis of "first derivative" information, are candidates for global
 optima. Thus the critical optima set contains the global optima set, but may also
 contain other points. We shall obtain necessary and sufficient conditions on the
 utility gradients at x for x to belong to IO( W, D). Consequently these conditions
 will be necessary for a point to belong to the core. Under some conditions the
 critical and global optima sets coincide, and in this case, our conditions are
 necessary and sufficient for a point to belong to the core.
 Say the smooth profile (ul,..., u,) is strictly pseudo-concave iff Vi e N, and
 any x, y E W it is the case that ui(y) > ui(x) implies that pi(x)(y-x)> O. More
 generally, say the preference profile is semi-convex iff Vi e N, and for any x e W
 {y E W: yPix} c Ht}(x).
 It is easy to show that if the profile is strictly pseudo-concave then it is semi-convex
 in the above sense, and then GO( W, D) = IO( W, D).
 LEMMA 1: (i) GO( W) c LO( W) c I0( W, D). Moreover ifpreferences are semi-
 convex, then these sets are identical.
 (ii) If x E Int W then a necessary and sufficient condition for x e IO( W, D) is
 that O nc D Pc(x).
 2 We use the convention that sp0(x) = {0}, and p0(x) = 0.
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 PROOF: Using Taylor's Theorem, we can prove that if H'c(x) $ 0, for some
 C E D, then in any neighborhood V of x, 3y E V such that yPcx (e.g., see Schofield
 (1984a), Lemma 4.19). Thus x j IO(W, D) implies x/ LO(W) and hence x
 GO( W). When preferences are semi-convex, then for any C c N,
 {y E W: yPcx} c H' (x).
 Thus,
 x.z1GO(W)=:>H9(x)$0 forsome C E D
 X=>x ji IO ( W, D).
 (ii) From a standard argument (see, e.g., Schofield (1978 and 1983)) if x e Int W
 then for any C c N,
 HC(x)= 0 iff Oepc(x). Q.E.D.
 Thus a necessary condition for xc Int Wrn GO( W) is that Oepc(x) VC eD.
 We now show that this latter condition is equivalent to a condition on pivotal
 rather than decisive coalitions.
 4. SYMMETRY CONDITIONS FOR A CORE
 In this section we define the notion of "pivotal" coalitions and use this notion
 to develop symmetry conditions, similar to the Plott (1967) symmetry condition
 for majority rule, which characterize IO( W, D) for a fixed smooth profile, u.
 DEFINITION 1: Given any family D of subsets of N and any L c N, we define
 the set of pivotal coalitions for D in L, written EL(D), as the set of all coalitions
 M c L such. that for every binary partition { C, D} of L - M, either M u C E D
 or M u D E D. We write EL for EL(D) when there is no danger of confusion.
 It is easy to see that, since D is monotonic, so is EL; i.e., any superset of a
 pivotal coalition is also pivotal.
 DEFINITION 2: Let x e W. We say x satisfies the pivotal gradient restrictions
 (PGR) with respect to D iff, for every L c N and every M E EL(D), G E PM*(x),
 where M* = {i E L: pi(X) E SPM (X)}.
 We offer a loose interpretation of the above definition: Say that the pivotal
 coalition, M E EL is "blocked" if G E PM*(X). If M is blocked, then there are some
 members of L, whose gradients lie in the same subspace as those of M, but not
 in the same half space. See Figure 1. Thus, the members of M* cannot agree on
 any common direction to move. The PGR condition, then, simply specifies that
 every pivotal coalition, in every subset L of N, must be blocked in the above sense.
 THEOREM 1: If x e Int W then a necessary and sufficient condition for x e
 IO( W, D) is that x satisfies PGR with respect to D.
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 / ~~~~~~~~~ opiX)
 (a) i, j blocked internally
 Pk(X)
 Pj (x) pi (x)pix
 (b) I i, i blocked by other players
 FIGURE 1-Examples of ways in which {iij} can be blocked.
 PROOF: (i) Let L ' N and suppose, for some M E EL, that O L PM*(x). Suppose
 that dim [spM (x)] = w. Then M* = L. But since M e EL, then L contains some
 decisive coalition, C say. But then Oz0PM*(x) implies O . Ppc(x), a contradiction.
 Suppose that dim [spM(x)] < w. Then 3,3 E RW with /3 pi(x) = 0 for all i e M*,
 and -3*pi(x)0O for all icEL-M*. Let A={icEL:3* pi(x)>0} and B=
 {i E L: 3 pi(x)<O}. But since M E EL, and M*D-M, we have M* E EL. Hence
 M* u A E D or M* u B E D. Without loss of generality, assume Me u A E D. Now
 if 0 PM*(x), then by the separating hyperplane theorem, 3 a E spM*(x) = spM (x)
 with a * pi(x) > 0 for all i E M*. Now pick 8 E R+ with (/3 + 8a) - pi(x) > 0 for all
 ieA and set y=/3+8a. Then y- pi(x)>0 for all ie M*u A. But then 0 pc(x)
 where C = M u A E D. By Lemma 1, x 0 IO(Int W, D). Hence PGR is a necessary
 condition.3
 (ii) To prove sufficiency, note that for any M E D if we set L = M then M E EL
 and M* = M. Hence PGR=>that G E PM (x) VM E D. Q.E.D.
 3The reader may wish to verify that, with the convention described in footnote 2, the proof of
 the theorem is valid in the case M = 0.
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 COROLLARY 1: PGR is a necessary conditionfor an interior point of W to belong
 to GO(W). Moreover, with semi-convex preferences the condition is also sufficient.
 PROOF: This follows directly from Theorem 1 together with Lemma 1.
 Q.E.D.
 5. APPLICATIONS TO GENERAL RULES
 We now show how the PGR conditions can be applied to particular social
 choice functions, and how for majority rule, the conditions imply the Plott
 symmetry conditions.
 Note that the PGR conditions specify symmetry conditions that must hold for
 every L cN. However, if pi(x)=0 for some i eL, then the PGR symmetry
 conditions are trivially satisfied for that L. Hence the most useful gradient
 restrictions are obtained by setting L c {i E N: pi(x) $ 0}. In particular, a necessary
 condition for x to be a core point is that the PGR symmetry conditions be met
 for the set L= {i E N: pi(x) 0}.
 As an example, consider a q-rule, whose decisive coalitions are given by
 D = {C c N: JCIj q}. The q-rule contains majority rule (with n odd or even) as
 a special case. Supra-majority rules of this kind have been studied by a number
 of writers (e.g., Ferejohn and Grether (1974), Greenberg (1979), Peleg (1978),
 Sloss (1973), Matthews (1980), Slutsky (1979). To obtain the core symmetry
 conditions for such a rule, assume that q < n and define e(n, q) = 2q - n -1. Then
 it is easy to verify (McKelvey and Schofield (1986)) that
 (a) if ILl = n, then EL= {M c N: IMI > e(n, q)};
 (b) if IL = n- 1, then EL= {M L: IMI| e(n, q)+ 1}.
 Now, setting L= {i E N: pi(x) $ 0}, we obtain necessary conditions for a point
 x to be a core point of a q-rule when no more than one person is satiated at x:
 Either no one is satiated at x, and all coalitions of size e(n, q) are blocked, or
 one person is satiated at x, and all coalitions of size e(n, q)+ 1 (among the
 remaining individuals) are blocked. (Compare to Slutsky (1979).)
 We now show how the Plott (1967) symmetry conditions for the existence of
 a majority rule core obtain as a special case of Theorem 1. Specifically, the Plott
 conditions deal with the case of majority rule when n is odd and when no two
 voters have common satiation points. The conditions specify the following:
 CONDITION (PO): pj(x)=O for some j cN, and for all iEN-{j}, 3kE
 N-{i,j} with pi(x)=-akpk(x) for some ak > O.
 However, majority rule is a q-rule, with q = (n + 1)/2, and e(n, q) = 0, when n
 is odd. Setting L = {i E N: pi(x) $ 0} and using the characterization of the pivotal
 sets given above, it is easily verified that the pivotal gradient restrictions imply
 condition PO:
 928
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Mon, 18 Sep 2017 21:52:03 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 GENERALIZED SYMMETRY CONDITIONS 929
 (a) If I i= n, then EL ={M: MI M , so 0 EL. Since sp0(x) = {O} we see
 that 0 * = 0. But p0(x) 0 contradicting the pivotal gradient restriction that
 O E p0(x). Hence x 0 IO(W, D).
 (b) If ILJ=n-1, then L=N-{j} for some j N (i.e., pj(x)= 0), and EL=
 {C c N - {j}: I CJ 1}. Hence, for all i E N - {j}, {i} E EL. Hence O E pi*(x), which
 implies that 3k E N - {i, j} with pi(x) = -akpk(x) for some ak > 0.
 This gives Plott's theorem as an immediate corollary of Theorem 1.
 COROLLARY 2: Let P be majority rule, with n odd, and assume x E W satisfies
 {i E N: pi(x) = O}J1 1. Then x E GO n Int W implies that condition PO is met.
 To show how Theorem 1 may be used in the general case, we let n = 5 and
 consider a social choice rule with the following decisive coalitions (we only list
 the minimal decisive sets): D = {{1, 2, 5}, {1, 3, 5}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {4, 5}}. Then
 the pivotal sets for ILI : 4 can be described as follows (we only list the minimal
 pivotal sets). Let Li = N-{i}, and write EL, =Ei:
 L Pivotal Sets
 N EN = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}}
 L1 E1 = {{2}, {3}, {4}, {5}}
 L2 E2={{1,3},{4},{5}}
 L3 E3 -{{1,2},{4},{5}}
 L4 E4={{1,2},{1,3},{5}}
 L5 E5 = {{2, 4}, {3, 4}, {2, 3}}.
 Thus, as above, setting L = {i E N: pi (x) # O}, we obtain necessary conditions
 for x to be a core noint if no more than one individual is satiated at x: Either
 no individual is satiated, and all coalitions in EN are blocked, or individual i is
 satiated and all coalitions in Ei are blocked. Figure 2 illustrates how a core can
 occur at individual 5's ideal point in two dimensions, and Figure 3 illustrates
 how a core can occur at 5's ideal point in three dimensions. In these figures, we
 assume, for ease of illustration, that each player has a "Type I" or Euclidean
 FIGURE 2xpocrfDitdm isaia
 xo
 FIGURE 2-Example of core for D in two dimensions, at ideal point of individual 5.
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 X1~~X
 2 __
 FIGURE 3*-Example of core for D in three dimensions, at ideal point of individual 5.
 * The ideal pointx4, x*, x*, and X4, are all in the subspace represented by the plane drawn. The ideal point x*, may be off the plane.
 preference of the type ui(x) = -1/211x_ XII2 where 11 11 is the standard Euclidean
 norm, and x4 is the ideal point of player i, where pi(x4) = 0.
 In Figure 3, if x4 is the core, then this point must belong to the set A, defined
 to be the convex hull of {4x, x4, 4x}. Transversality arguments (McKelvey and
 Schofield (1986), and Smale (1973)) show that for an open dense set of profiles,
 the objects {4x} and A are respectively zero- and two-dimensional and do not
 intersect in R3. Thus the core in Figure 3 is "structurally unstable"; i.e., arbitrarily
 small perturbation will destroy the conditions for a core. On the other hand, in
 the two dimensional case of Figure 2, the pivotal gradient restrictions are robust
 under small perturbations and so the core is "structurally stable." Arguments of
 this sort can be used to establish the maximum dimension which will yield
 existence of structurally stable cores for arbitrary social choice functions. See
 McKelvey and Schofield (1986) and Schofield (1986)) for further discussion.
 The results of Section 4 and these examples above are valid when the set of
 alternatives is unconstrained. Political institutions frequently impose feasibility
 constraints on social choice, and in the following section we show how these can
 be incorporated in more general pivotal gradient restrictions.
 6. APPLICATIONS: CONSTRAINED CORES AND CYCLE SETS
 We can use Theorem 1 to characterize points in a constrained core. We fix
 x E W Then for any v E RW, define the v restriction on W by
 W= {y W: y v , x v}.
 Say that x is a v constrained core, whenever x E GO( Wy); i.e., x is a core in the
 constrained set W,.
 Another way of thinking of a constrained core is to introduce another voter,
 say voter "n + 1," who has utility gradient pn+,(x) = v, and who must be included
 in any winning coalition. Using this motivation, we define a new set N, = N u
 {n + 1} of voters, and the corresponding set D, of decisive coalitions by
 D, ={Ccz Nv: n+ E C and C\{n+1}eD}.
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 Given DV, and any Lc: Nv, then as before EL(DV) is the set of pivotal coalitions
 for DV in L. An easy argument shows that IO( Wv, D) = IO( W, DV). Then Theorem
 1 immediately gives the following corollary.
 COROLLARY 3: If x E Int W then x E IO( Wv, D) iffx satisfies PGR with respect
 to DV.
 Applying Lemma 1 yields the following Corollary.
 COROLLARY 4: If x E Int Wthen a necessary condition forx to be a v-constrained
 core is that x satisfies PGR with respect to DV. If preferences are semi-convex, then
 the condition is sufficient.
 To illustrate, consider the case of majority rule with n odd. As we have noted,
 0 c EN(D), so {n + I} c ENV(DV). Hence, it follows from the pivotal gradient
 restrictions that there exists k E N with pk(X) = -Av for some A E R with A > 0.
 Now let L = Nv\{k}. Then it follows that any set of the form M = {j, n + 1} is
 pivotal if j {k, n + 1}. It follows again, from the pivotal gradient conditions, that
 OpM*(x), where M* = {i c L: pi(x) c spM (x)}. In particular, it follows that 3i c
 N\{j, k} with pi(x) E sPM(X). But, if all gradients are nonzero, this is exactly the
 "joint symmetry" condition given by McKelvey (1979).
 The symmetry properties for a majority rule constrained core which can be
 deduced from Corollary 4 are identical to those mentioned by Plott (1967). The
 corollary also shows how to obtain necessary symmetry properties at a constrained
 core for an arbitrary social order. Note also that Corollary 3 can be easily extended
 to the case where there exists a family of constraints at the point.
 The notion of a constrained core is also helpful in characterizing the cycle set
 LC(W). Define the critical cycle set (Schofield (1978)) written IC(W) by xe
 IC( W) iff (i) Ozpc(x) for at least one C E D, and (ii) = nC eD(x) Pc(x) where
 D(x) ={C E D: Opc (x)}.
 The critical cycle set bears the same relation to the local and global cycle sets
 as the critical optima bear to the local and global core points. It is the set of
 points which, on the basis of "first derivative information," are candidates for
 the cycle sets. Earlier results have shown that IC( W) is open in W and
 IC(W) c LC(W) cclos IC(W)
 where clos IC( W) is the closure of IC( W) in W (Schofield (1978, 1984b)).
 THEOREM 2: x E (Int W)\IC( W) if there exists a vector vx E RW\{O} sucli that
 x satisfies PGR with respect to D1,,.
 PROOF: If x E (Int W)\IC( W), then either (i) or (ii) in the definition of IC( W)
 must fail. If (i) fails, then OcnCEDpC(x)I implying xe IO(W, D). Moreover,
 for any v E RW\{O}, IO( W, D) c IO( W,, D). By Corollary 1, x must satisfy PGR
 with respect to Dv. If (ii) fails, then there exists vx E RW\{O} such that, for all
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 B E D either 0 E PB(X) or -vx E PB(X). Define p?1 (x) = v,. Now for any B C N,
 BED<*B'=Bu{n+1}EDX.- Hence OEPB(X) or -vXEPB(X), VBED<Oe
 PB (X) VB'E D, < x satisfies PRG with respect to DV,, by Theorem 1. Q.E.D.
 COROLLARY 5: If LC( W) is empty then at every point in the interior of W, there
 exists a vector v., E RW such that x satisfies PGR with respect to DvX.
 PROOF: By previous results LC( W) is empty iff IC( W) is empty which implies
 that Int W r- IC( W) is empty. The result follows by Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
 Early results by Cohen and Matthews (1980), McKelvey (1979), and Schofield
 (1983) only considered the cycle set for majority rule. Theorem 2, together with
 Corollary 5 and the comments following Corollary 4, give symmetry conditions
 which are necessary if a point is to lie outside the cycle set not just for majority
 rule but for an arbitrary social order.
 Notice that Plott (1967, p 793) in his analysis of majority rule observed that a
 constraint could be represented by an "invisible" veto player. For an arbitrary
 social order the new player (n + 1) introduced in the proof of Corollary 3 and
 Theorem 2 has precisely the same function. This means effectively that LC = 0
 if and only if it is the case that, at each point x, there exists an "invisible" veto
 player ix who in fact "represents" the social order.
 Our work is related to that of Slutsky (1979) and Matthews (1980, 1982), who
 derive symmetry conditions for cores of alpha-majority rule and anonymous
 simple games, respectively. (Matthews also obtains conditions for constrained
 cores.) Their symmetry conditions give inequalities on the number of voters with
 gradients in opposing cones, in contrast to those here, which give classes of
 coalitions whose gradients must be "blocked." In addition to being applicable
 to arbitrary voting rules, our conditions have proven more useful than previous
 symmetry conditions in extending generic existence results for cores and cycle
 sets to more general voting rules (McKelvey and Schofield (1986)).
 Finally, we note that the analysis of the previous sections can be extended to
 the case where W is a smooth manifold of dimension (dim (W)) equal to w.
 Division of the Humanities and the Social Sciences, California Institute of Tech-
 nology, Pasadena, CA 91125, U.S.A.
 and
 Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO 63130, U.S.A.
 Manuscript received June, 1985; final revision received June, 1986.
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